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The SCSC publishes a range of documents:

Newsletter

The club publishes its newsletter Safety Systems three times a year in February, June and October.  The newsletter is distributed to paid-up members and can be made available in electronic form for inclusion on corporate members' intranet sites.

Symposium proceedings

The proceedings of the annual symposium, held each February since 1993, are published in book form. Since 2013 copies can be purchased from Amazon.

Safety-Critical Systems eJournal

The club publishes the Safety-critical Systems eJournal (ISSN 2754-1118) containing high-quality, peer-reviewed articles on the subject of systems safety.
 If you are interested in being an author or a reviewer please see the Call for Papers.

All publications are available to download free by current SCSC members (please log in first), recent books are available as 'print on demand' from Amazon at reasonable cost.

All PublicationsPage

Feb 2017
A selection of articles from twenty-five years of the SCSC newsletter Safety Systems
Feb 2017
[SCSC-135] Developments in System Safety Engineering
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Edited by Mike Parsons and Tim Kelly
Ref: ISBN 978-1540796288
Available: Buy the book on Amazon £10.25 or download papers (free to members).
Abstract:
Developments in System Safety Engineering contains papers presented at the twenty-fifth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held in Bristol,  …    Developments in System Safety Engineering contains papers presented at the twenty-fifth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held in Bristol, UK, in February 2017. The Symposium is for engineers, managers and academics in the field of system safety, across all industry sectors, so the papers making up this volume offer wide coverage of current safety topics, and a blend of academic research and industrial experience. They include both recent developments in the field and discussion of open issues and questions. The topics covered in this volume include: New Challenges, New Techniques, Software, Safety and Security, Analyses, Data Safety and Accidents. This book will be of interest to practitioners, managers and academics working in the safety-critical and safety-related systems areas.  

Contents

Paper: Playing Catch – Up: The Fate of Safety Engineering? - John A McDermid
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Scientific and engineering disciplines advance by establishing, refining, and occasionally rejecting theories. A key part of this process is  …    Scientific and engineering disciplines advance by establishing, refining, and occasionally rejecting theories. A key part of this process is the constant use of experience (more particularly the results of ‘experiments’) to challenge orthodoxy. One marker of the vigour of an academic discipline is how much of this challenge comes from within. Safety engineering appears to advance mainly by “playing catch up” i.e. responding to the challenges presented by advances in other disciplines including psychology, human actors, and organisational science. This paper considers whether the trend is inevitable, or whether advances in safety engineering can be more systematic and pro-active.   
Paper: The “rise of the machine” and the need for a System - of - Systems safety methodology? - Mike Brownsword, Andy German and Ian Mitchell
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
The approaches used today for assuring safety of Systems-of-Systems have evolved and matured over many years. Governments are increasingly  …    The approaches used today for assuring safety of Systems-of-Systems have evolved and matured over many years. Governments are increasingly encouraging automation and businesses are progressively digitising our System-of-Systems, which may ultimately result in the removal of skilled people from positions of control. Examples of these digitised System-of-Systems include driverless trains, planes/drones, submersibles and cars; however this trend extends into all industry domains including the medical and defence are-as. The “rise of the machine” cannot be stopped and therefore results in the need for designers and safety engineers to think about: (1) significant System-of-Systems issues and epochs; and (2) how safety can be designed using a common methodology or codes of practice. This paper draws on experience from work undertaken in a number of domains including energy, rail, defence, aerospace and information technology systems. This paper explores System-of-Systems problems including: epoch identification, risk ownership, disparate legislation and regulation, and why bottom-up summing of component safety arguments fails to address the problem. It proposes the need to imagine and develop safe systems of operation and test these. It considers how techniques such as Soft Systems Methodology, Systems Engineering, Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) and Hybrid Development Lifecycles may aid System-of-Systems safety understanding and may help to expose potentially harmful emergent properties.  
Paper: Progress Towards the Assurance of Non - Traditional Software - Rob Ashmore, Elizabeth Lennon
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Traditional software development follows a hierarchical process, with system-level requirements allocated to software being  …    Traditional software development follows a hierarchical process, with system-level requirements allocated to software being progressively refined through high-level requirements into source code, coverage of which is a key measure of test completeness. This approach establishes a direct link between system-level requirements and the software implementation; it also assumes that executable behaviour is governed by the structure of the source code. Although it is still widely applicable, there are cases where the suitability of this traditional model is less apparent. Consider an algorithm implemented via a neural network. In this case the structure of the source code has much less effect on the software's behaviour than in the traditional case: the same generic neural network software could be trained to perform two very different functions. The link between the implementation and the high-level requirements is also harder to trace than in the traditional case. More generally, some of the approaches used to assure software may not be appropriate for new types of algorithm; nevertheless, such algorithms are becoming increasingly common. In response, this paper considers how current methods, notably the 'four plus one' software safety assurance principles, might be enhanced to support the assurance of non-traditional software.  
Paper: Functional Safety: Where have we come from? Where are we going? - Audrey Canning
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This paper provides a personal perspective of the history and evolution of the discipline of Functional Safety. It starts with the concerns that  …    This paper provides a personal perspective of the history and evolution of the discipline of Functional Safety. It starts with the concerns that provided the early drivers, the initiatives that moved the discipline from a diverse and adhoc collection of different control measures, to an internationally recognised, systematic framework with a broad spectrum of risk reduction principles, to sector customised approaches for the consequences, risk reduction customs and system behaviours found in different industry sectors. It also poses the question of where future advancements will lie, in further refinement into sector and industry specific practices or through development of a more comprehensive framework able to adapt to a wide variety of different threats in a uniform manner.  
Paper: Going ‘Back to the Future’: Developing safety - critical embedded systems using modern Time - Triggered software architectures - Michael J. Pont
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This paper is concerned with the development of software for real-time, safety-related embedded systems. The particular focus of the paper is on  …    This paper is concerned with the development of software for real-time, safety-related embedded systems. The particular focus of the paper is on ‘Time-Triggered’ (TT) systems. TT design can be viewed as a subset of more generic ‘Event Triggered’ (ET) designs. When compared with ET alternatives, TT designs have a simple software architecture and – once constructed – are generally accepted as being easier to test. As a consequence, forms of TT design have been used for many years in industries such as aerospace, because they have been found to provide the basis for safe and reliable systems. Despite the growing demand for safety-related embedded systems in sectors such as industrial control, automotive and household goods, use of TT architectures is less common than ET architectures in these areas. This paper explores some of the benefits of modern TT designs, and considers some of the reasons why this approach is less commonly used than ET architectures in current safety-related designs.   
Paper: Product Integrity Assurance Argument Framework for Vehicle Autonomy - John Birch, Mark Cousen, David Ward
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Increasing autonomy of vehicle control features requires product integrity considerations that push the boundaries, and lie beyond the  …    Increasing autonomy of vehicle control features requires product integrity considerations that push the boundaries, and lie beyond the scope, of the present edition of the automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262. They include reliability, availability and cyber security as well as the safety-related aspects of Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF), fail-operational functionality and the human-machine interaction. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a framework for the construction of an explicit product integrity assurance argument that caters for such considerations. The proposed framework builds on work previously developed by MISRA for arguing the achievement of functional safety within the scope of ISO 26262. The paper asserts that there is particular value in the creation of an explicit, holistic, product assurance ar- gument for vehicles that feature autonomy as the considerations are inherently interrelated and extend beyond the scope of any one particular industry standard.  
Paper: Experiences of avionics safety certification of an ARINC 653 RTOS on multi-core processor architecture - Paul J. Parkinson
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
The avionics industry is currently undergoing a transition to multi-core processor architectures. This transition provides the potential  …    The avionics industry is currently undergoing a transition to multi-core processor architectures. This transition provides the potential for increased functionality on a common computing platform, while reducing size, weight and power (SWaP). The advent of multi-core processor architectures also presents new challenges in the design, implementation and safety-certification of real-time operating systems (RTOS). In this paper, the impact of multi-core architecture on RTOS design, the ARINC 653 software standard, and safety-certification under RTCA DO-178C and EUROCAE ED-12C will be considered. Additionally Wind River’s experiences of the DO-178C DAL A safety certification of VxWorks 653 Multi-core Edition on the NXP QorIQ T2080 multi-core processor will be presented.  
Paper: Confidence in a connected world: safe, secure, resilient and autonomous - Robin E Bloomfield, Kate Netkachova, Peter Bishop
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Since establishment of the SCSC in 1992 the world of safety-related computing and assurance has changed enormously, but the  …    Since establishment of the SCSC in 1992 the world of safety-related computing and assurance has changed enormously, but the fundamental principles of the approaches articulated in the first decade of the club remain valid. However, since 2000 the dramatic growth in the Internet and the changes to security threats exemplified by the attacks of 9/11 have changed the safety engineering world. The need for change is further illustrated by the impact of climate change, the growing importance of interdependencies and lessons from Fukushima accident emphasising the need for resilience. Innovation in technology, in particular the increasing autonomy of systems, also provides another driver for change. The paper therefore discusses these three challenges: security-informed safety, resilience and autonomy. But in addition there is a significant challenge in that we must not forget “normal business”: the challenge of continuing to apply what we know in a rigorous and competent manner in the light of organisational change, project pressures and resource limitations.  
Paper: Software Handling of Hardware Errors - Chris Hobbs
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Developing embedded systems for safety-critical markets is not easy. Over the past decade, detecting and handling the errors arising  …    Developing embedded systems for safety-critical markets is not easy. Over the past decade, detecting and handling the errors arising from increasingly unreliable hardware and increasingly complex, multi-threaded software has made this even more difficult. This paper describes a software architecture that separates various aspects of the system design, providing increased and tuneable immunity to random software and hardware errors.  
Paper: Closing the Gap – The Formally Verified Optimizing Compiler CompCert - Daniel Kästner, Xavier Leroy, Sandrine Blazy, Bernhard Schommer, Michael Schmidt, Christian Ferdinand
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
CompCert is the first commercially available optimizing compiler that is formally verified, using machine-assisted mathematical proofs, to  …    CompCert is the first commercially available optimizing compiler that is formally verified, using machine-assisted mathematical proofs, to be free from miscompilation. The executable code it produces is proved to behave exactly as specified by the semantics of the source C program. CompCert's intended use is the compilation of safety-critical and mission-critical software meeting high levels of assurance. This article gives an overview of the design of CompCert and its proof concept, summarizes the resulting confidence argument, and gives an overview of relevant tool qualification strategies. We briefly summarize practical experience and give an overview of recent CompCert developments.  
Paper: Using Formal Proof to meet Executable Object Code and Coverage Objectives in DO-333 - N J Tudor, C M O’Halloran
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This paper describes a technology proof of concept for the automated verification of Executable Object Code (EOC) using Formal Methods.  …    This paper describes a technology proof of concept for the automated verification of Executable Object Code (EOC) using Formal Methods. The project called FEVER was carried out by D-RisQ Ltd in conjunction with Lemma1, both small companies with expertise on various facets of formal verification. The target use of FEVER is within embedded systems that will be require safety certification, specifically targeting unmanned systems. The rationale being that if a route to certification using formal development from requirements to EOC could be shown, then the perceived untenable amount of testing for such systems could be drastically reduced. We chose to use the aerospace software guidance DO-178C, the Formal Methods Supplement DO-333 and Tool Qualification DO-330 as these set out the relevant Objectives for a formal development. The work required the use of a formalised version of the ARM 7 Instruction Set Architecture. This was captured in a language called HOL and was based upon work carried out by Cambridge University. The project used source code for a simple decision making system written in C in order to develop the technology.  
Paper: My 36 Years in System Safety Engineering: Looking Backward, Looking Forward - Nancy G. Leveson
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
A personal view of where we have come from in system safety, where we are now, and what is needed going forward.
Paper: From Safety Cases to Security Cases - R D Alexander, R D Hawkins, T P Kelly
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they provide a way to justify the safety of a system and render that justification  …    Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they provide a way to justify the safety of a system and render that justification open to review. Assurance cases have not been widely used in security, but there is guidance available and there have been some promising experiments. There are a number of differences between safety and security which have implications for how we create security cases, but they do not appear to be insurmountable. It appears that the process of creating a security case is compatible with typical evaluation processes, and will have additional benefits in terms of training and corporate memory. In this paper we discuss some of the implications and challenges of applying the practice of assurance case construction from the safety domain to the security domain.  
Paper: Cyber Safety and Security for Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) - Kevin R. Driscoll
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
The civil aviation industry is looking into reduced crew operations (RCO) that would cut today's two-person flight crews down to  …    The civil aviation industry is looking into reduced crew operations (RCO) that would cut today's two-person flight crews down to single-person crews with support from ground-based crews. Shared responsibility across air and ground personnel will require highly reliable and secure data communication with supporting automation, which will be safety-critical for passenger and cargo aircraft. This paper looks at the different types and degrees of authority delegation given from the air to the ground and the ramifications of each, including the safety and security hazards introduced, the mitigation mechanisms for these hazards, and other demands on an RCO system architecture, which would be highly invasive into (almost) all safety-critical avionics. The related areas of unmanned aerial systems and autonomous ground vehicles are reviewed to find problems that RCO may face, and related aviation accident scenarios are described. Potential problems with RCO data communication encryption are identified. This paper concludes with questioning the economic viability of RCO in the light of the expense of overcoming the safety and security hazards it would introduce.  
Paper: Waking up to The Insider as a Safety-Critical Threat - Ryan Meeks and Robert Dickie
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.

The Insider threat is rarely considered as part of functional safety to inform design, process and procedure. Worryingly, it is often  …   

The Insider threat is rarely considered as part of functional safety to inform design, process and procedure. Worryingly, it is often neglected as part of safety and risk management practices entirely. This must change in light of high profile cases in recent years where Insiders have been seen to pose a severe threat. Industry must attempt to analyse and understand Insider threat risk and build this into integral processes, which will require close collaboration across diverse technical areas and specialisms. Government policy may even be developed in the coming years, similar to that of US Executive Order 13587, which necessitates a more comprehensive consideration of these risks. Now is the time for safety-critical industries to wake up to the Insider threat as one of the most real and present dangers to organisations in the modern age.

This paper is a thought-piece about how Insider threat could be dealt with as part of normal engineering practice, and proposes a concept methodology for the formal assessment of Insider threat risk to systems and organisations. The paper deals only with deliberate and malicious acts (intended to do harm in some way), rather than the unintentional insider threat.

  
Paper: From the IBM 29 Card Punch to the Boeing 787 Dreamliner (and Beyond) - Dewi Daniels
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This paper is a reflection on the author’s career in software engineering over the last 35 years, with an emphasis on what he has learned  …    This paper is a reflection on the author’s career in software engineering over the last 35 years, with an emphasis on what he has learned along the way and its relevance to safety-critical avionic software development.  
Paper: Analysis of Effects induced by EM disturbances on COTS Devices, from an EM Security and Functional Safety perspective - José Lopes Esteves, Chaouki Kasmi, Andy Degraeve, Davy Pissoort, Keith Armstrong
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Electromagnetic Security refers to the compliance of electronic devices with Information Security requirements with regards to  …    Electromagnetic Security refers to the compliance of electronic devices with Information Security requirements with regards to electromagnetic disturbances, and has important implications where there are Functional Safety or other risks to be managed. In this study, the resilience and the integrity of electronic devices are the topics of interest. Many studies have been devoted to the detection, the analysis and the classification of failures and damage by electromagnetic interference induced on commercial off-the-shelf devices, which mostly require external monitoring and measurement equipment. More recently, an approach based on the exploitation of existing internal resources of the tested devices has been proposed. Monitoring of effects due to exposure to EM fields is important for both EM Security and Functional Safety. This paper shows how this can be done by measuring the existing internal parameters of computers and smartphones during exposure to unintentional or intentional electromagnetic fields.  
Paper: Sneak Path Analysis: Realising the Potential - Steve Gregory
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Sneak Analysis (SA) is a technique originating from work carried out by Boeing in the 1960s. Sneak Path Analysis (SPA) is a derivative of SA  …    Sneak Analysis (SA) is a technique originating from work carried out by Boeing in the 1960s. Sneak Path Analysis (SPA) is a derivative of SA that focuses on the identification of latent, unintended paths that, under specific circumstances, can cause otherwise functional systems to exhibit undesired behaviours. SPA has not, however, been globally embraced by the safety engineering community. This is unfortunate, as there are some unique concepts and features of SPA (such as the explicit identification of systematic design flaws) that cannot be substituted by any other safety analysis techniques. This paper summarises a project that resulted in the development of a revised SPA procedure that can be implemented as an extension of the widely utilised Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. The procedure was applied to practical examples and was shown to be repeatable, efficient and applicable to a range of technologies.  
Paper: HFACS: Helicopter Operations’ Safety - José Corrêa de Sá
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is an accident investigation methodology. It is based on Reason model, the  …    Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is an accident investigation methodology. It is based on Reason model, the causality perspective commonly known as “Swiss Cheese” model. HFACS methodology became necessary because the Reason model is primarily descriptive, not analytical. It was designed to facilitate the application of this model to accident investigation and analysis. It was, specifically, developed to define the latent and active failures implicated in Reason model; and, refined through the analysis of hundreds of Aviation accident reports, containing thousands of human causal factors. The present work aims to evaluate the use of HFACS for the improvement of the Brazilian helicopter offshore transport industry safety performance. To do so, the present paper presents the Reason model, the HFACS and the HFACS-HE frameworks, considering evolution, limits, critical reviews, and applications (particularly, in Aviation). A documentary analysis of selected helicopter offshore transport industry accident reports from Brazil was carried out using HFACS-HE. Then, the study was compared with other studies already carried out for similar operations. It concludes that the causality model and culture frameworks have an impact on the application of HFACS, and on the safety performance.  
Paper: Integrating Data into the Safety Assessment Methodology for Defence - Louise Harney
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
The work of the Data Safety Initiative Working Group (DSIWG) has been progressing since January 2013 with the aim of integrating the assessment of  …    The work of the Data Safety Initiative Working Group (DSIWG) has been progressing since January 2013 with the aim of integrating the assessment of data safety into the system engineering development process, which incorporates system safety assessment. While the Data Safety Guidance is being continually improved and public emphasis on data in our lives is growing, Raytheon UK is integrating the data safety assessment into the system safety assessment process. Raytheon UK’s previous case study focussed on Air Traffic Management Systems (ATMS) but, since there are a multitude of safety assessment requirements which are customer-dependent within ATMS, this methodology paper focusses on defence and aims to develop sector-specific data safety guidance for defence engineering programmes in the UK.  
Paper: Cybersecurity problems in a typical hospital (and probably in all of them) - Harold Thimbleby
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.

A criminal case balancing on the corruption of patient data in a UK hospital resulted in some nurses being acquitted and some given  …   

A criminal case balancing on the corruption of patient data in a UK hospital resulted in some nurses being acquitted and some given community service and custodial sentences. This paper explains the background, demonstrates the inability of hospital IT systems to provide reliable evidence, and highlights broader problems with IT culture affecting manufacturers, hospitals, police, legal advisors — and ultimately misleading clinicians and compromising delivery of care.

The NHS (and healthcare more generally) urgently needs to improve its IT awareness, management and policies. The police and the legal system need a more mature approach to IT. Manufacturers need to provide dependable systems that are fit for purpose for complex hospital environments. Regulators should ensure that systems meet better standards of quality and dependability.

This paper includes recommendations; the most fundamental being that hospitals acknowledge that IT is unreliable and they should procure and manage equipment with this in mind. In particular, mature and effective data protection and cybersecurity policies must be in place and used proactively. When problems occur, evidence derived from IT (whether systems or devices) must not be used in legal or disciplinary investigations without extreme care and independent proof of provenance.

  
Paper: Data: Your Life in its Hands - Tom Adams, Paul Hampton, Mike Parsons
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This work is an examination of how safety-related data is currently being managed across the healthcare domain in the UK. Some areas where safety  …    This work is an examination of how safety-related data is currently being managed across the healthcare domain in the UK. Some areas where safety data can cause specific problems are highlighted and extant mitigations noted. Some case studies where data has been a contributory factor in the occurrence of harm are discussed. The work concludes with new proposed guidance material to supplement the existing safety guidance on Health IT Systems.  
Paper: Safety critical systems - A brief history of the development of guidelines and standards - Ron Bell
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
This paper provides an overview of the development of standards and guidelines for safety critical systems over the past 35 years. In the  …    This paper provides an overview of the development of standards and guidelines for safety critical systems over the past 35 years. In the context of this paper “safety critical systems” refers to those systems that are intended to achieve, together with the other risk reduction measures, the necessary risk reduction to meet the required tolerable risk. The period covered by the paper is from the time that concerns were raised about the adoption of programmable electronic systems for implementing safety functions to today. It is essentially a personal account based on experience and reflections of the developments have taken place with to respect of guidelines and standards and is not intended in any way to be an authoritative account covering all industrial sectors.  
Paper: Balancing safety with rampant software feature-itis - Les Hatton
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
In the 30 years or so that we have been developing a safety methodology to accompany the growing presence of software in safety-related  …    In the 30 years or so that we have been developing a safety methodology to accompany the growing presence of software in safety-related systems, understanding of the software development process itself hardly seems to have advanced. We still use in most part the same languages we did then but duly bloated to match the uncontrollable growth of software itself. We still teach entire paradigms without any basis in the scientific method whatsoever whilst the amount of software continues to grow alarmingly, particularly in the automotive industry. The result is an absence of any real forensic basis for understanding failure and subsequently avoiding it. This short essay looks at some of the reasons why, and demonstrates from recent results in information theory, that this stems from the fact that we are probably barking up the wrong tree.  
Jan 2017
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
This resource is superseded by: [SCSC-127I]
May 2016
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 3
Feb 2016
Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK.
Jan 2016
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
This resource is superseded by: [SCSC-127I]
Jan 2016
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 2
Sep 2015
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 1
May 2015
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 3
Feb 2015
Proceedings of the Twenty-third Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Jan 2015
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
Jan 2015
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 2
Sep 2014
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 1
May 2014
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 23, Number 2
Feb 2014
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
This resource is superseded by: [SCSC-127I]