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The SCSC publishes a range of documents:
The club publishes its newsletter Safety Systems three times a year in February, June and October. The newsletter is distributed to paid-up members and can be made available in electronic form for inclusion on corporate members' intranet sites.
The proceedings of the annual symposium, held each February since 1993, are published in book form. Since 2013 copies can be purchased from Amazon.
The club publishes the Safety-critical Systems eJournal (ISSN 2754-1118) containing high-quality, peer-reviewed articles on the subject of systems safety.
If you are interested in being an author or a reviewer please see the Call for Papers.
All publications are available to download free by current SCSC members (please log in first), recent books are available as 'print on demand' from Amazon at reasonable cost.
This second issue of the Safety-Critical Systems eJournal, which is published by the Safety Critical Systems Club, clearly fulfils one of the purposes set out in the original brief for the journal. That is to provide a home for articles and papers that are too long for the Newsletter and Symposium. It illustrates two ways of presenting larger amounts of material: one paper is the first part of three, the other is a long paper, which may be built upon in later publications.
John Spriggs SCSC eJournal Editor
john.spriggs@scsc.uk
Contents
It is good to see the new Safety-Critical Systems Club eJournal’s first issue contributing to debate about the use of probabilistic models to evaluate the dependability of software-based systems. Such evaluation is particularly important for safety-critical systems,especially those whose failures may have massive consequences. Society needs assurances that such systems are “good enough”. It is therefore appropriate that methods for providing these assurances are subject to critical examination, as Daniels and Tudor do here (Daniels and Tudor 2022) —hereafter D&T for brevity.
D&T refer to moves within a civil aviation technical community towards giving more weight, in assessment, to records of good behaviour of the product, and perhaps less weight to records of precautions in development. They do not give enough detail for others to agree or not on whether these moves would be good or bad. We thus limit our discussion to their general claims against use of statical testing and operational evidence.