What can we learn from Grenfell inquiry report? The terrible tragedy of the Grenfell fire in which 72 people lost their lives is a very human story, and something we shall never forget. Is there anything a systems safety engineer should do? Here's a start: (i) Always take a holistic view of a system and its context, don't just look at its parts, (ii) Assess the impact of all evolutionary changes throughout a system's lifetime, (iii) Take a critical view of rules, regulations and standards as they may be not enough to ensure safety, (iv) Consider independent verification of critical items, and (v) Produce a living safety case for the system.
 

The next SCSC seminar on 26th September is all about putting AI and Autonomy into practice and how to ensure safe operation once in service. More details at: https://scsc.uk/e1133

CrowdStrike is all over the news: the impact of the faulty security software is immense. Some systems affected are safety-related (e.g. in Healthcare or Policing) and there will be some direct safety impacts, such as delayed treatments. Harder to quantify is the indirect effect: the mental (and financial) stress caused by major IT failures is huge. We wait to see what the root causes were, but we should not ignore the bigger picture: we have built systems, processes and services around commercial IT in a very fragile way when we know it can fail. Where were the workarounds, backups and alternate systems? This is definitely one for consideration in the 'Safer Complex Systems' Working Group.

The call for abstracts for the Safety Critical Systems Symposium 2025 (SSS'25) is now out: https://scsc.uk/e1099

Abstracts have to be sent to mike.parsons@scsc.uk by 31st July 2024.

* The Post Office Horizon system would not normally be regarded as a safety system, yet it is a computer-based system that has indirectly led to widespread harm.

* The ongoing public enquiry has raised important legal, ethical and technical concerns. Problems highlighted include: sub-postmasters could not see what was going on (for example, figures changed remotely without sub-postmaster knowledge), poor quality coding and lack of both audit and fault logging.

* The SCSC fully supports the public enquiry and other investigations, and we agree with professional computer bodies (e.g. the British Computer Society) that there should be a review of how computer-based system evidence is treated by the courts.

* We will look to adopt relevant recommendations and encourage our members to do the same once the enquiry and investigations conclude.

* We propose that organisations relying on computer-based system evidence in court should, where challenged, be required to justify that the system, including aspects such as hardware, software, data and service delivery, is reliable. Furthermore the evidence should be shown to be trustworthy. The justification should also show appropriate confidence in use, including in the way that reported problems are managed. Courts should not accept evidence relating to the computer-based system without this justification.

* Where there are disputes involving computer-based systems there must be fair treatment; i.e. where relevant, there must be access for both sides to technical experts who in turn must be given access to appropriate software and data.

* Post Office Horizon is an example of how systems, organisations, agreements, people and processes came together within a delivered service to result in indirect but severe harm. We suggest that the SCSC Service Assurance Guidance could be useful in such situations to reduce risks.

* We will extend the remit of the SCSC to cover any computer-based systems and services which could cause harm. This will include harm in the wider context of the system including all stakeholders, the environment and consequential harms, not just harm caused directly by the system or service itself.

Note: Here “computer-based system” includes aspects such as hardware, software, data and service delivery. 

Microsoft is opening a new office in London dedicated to artificial intelligence (AI) research and development: https://lnkd.in/e7BVeV-N
This technology is going to impact us in so many ways - the SCSC will look at some of the safety implications in a series of seminars this year. The first seminar looking at frameworks is on 25th April: https://scsc.uk/e1081

Applications for the IET Young Woman Engineer (YWE) of the Year Awards are now open, https://youngwomenengineer.theiet.org It would be great to see a Safety Engineer win this!

All the 1-day seminars this year will have an AI theme reflecting the importance of this rapidly evolving technology. The first is on April 25th and looks at frameworks for AI, subsequent seminars look at building systems with AI and operating them.