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Newsletter
The club has published its newsletter Safety Systems three times a year since 1991.
The newsletter is distributed to paid-up members and can be made available in electronic form for inclusion on corporate members' intranet sites.
An index of Newsletters since January 1998 is available on this page.
Symposium proceedings
The proceedings of the annual symposium, held each February since 1993, are published in book form. Copies can be purchased from the publisher and for SSS'13 and later are available on Amazon.
Details of all Symposium proceedings are available on this page.
All publications are available to download free by current SCSC members (please log in first), recent books are available as 'print on demand' from Amazon at reasonable cost.
SCSC Publications - List |
| Feb 2018
|
| [SCSC-140] Evolution of System Safety
Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, York, UK.
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| Jan 2018
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| [SCSC-141B] Goal Structuring Notation Community Standard (Version 2)
Version 2 of the Goal Structuring Notation Standard.
|
| Jan 2018
|
| [SCSC-127C] Data Safety Guidance (Version 3.0)
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
|
| Jan 2018
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| [SCSC-143] Safety-Related Challenges for Autonomous Systems
|
| Apr 2017
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| [SCSC-137] Agile Methods for Developing Safety-related Software?
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| Feb 2017
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| [SCSC-136] 25 at 25
A selection of articles from twenty-five years of the SCSC newsletter Safety Systems
|
| Feb 2017
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| [SCSC-135] Developments in System Safety Engineering
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
Edited by Mike Parsons and Tim Kelly
Ref: ISBN 978-1540796288
Publisher: SCSC on Amazon / CreateSpace
Available: Buy the book on Amazon £10.25 or download papers (free to members).
Developments in System Safety Engineering contains papers presented at the twenty-fifth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held in Bristol, UK, in February 2017. The Symposium is for engineers, managers and academics in the field of system safety, across all industry sectors, so the papers making up this volume offer wide coverage of current safety topics, and a blend of academic research and industrial experience. They include both recent developments in the field and discussion of open issues and questions. The topics covered in this volume include: New Challenges, New Techniques, Software, Safety and Security, Analyses, Data Safety and Accidents. This book will be of interest to practitioners, managers and academics working in the safety-critical and safety-related systems areas. Hide abstract 
| Playing Catch – Up: The Fate of Safety Engineering?
7th Feb 2017
Scientific and engineering disciplines advance by establishing, refining, and occasionally rejecting theories. A key part of this process is the constant use of experience (more particularly the results of ‘experiments’) to challenge orthodoxy. One marker of the vigour of an academic discipline is how
much of this challenge comes from within. Safety engineering appears to advance mainly by “playing catch up” i.e. responding to the challenges presented by advances in other disciplines including psychology, human actors, and organisational science. This paper considers whether the trend is inevitable, or whether advances in safety
engineering can be more systematic and pro-active. Hide abstract
| John A McDermid
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| The “rise of the machine” and the need for a System - of - Systems safety methodology?
7th Feb 2017
The approaches used today for assuring safety of Systems-of-Systems have evolved and matured over many years. Governments are increasingly encouraging automation and businesses are progressively digitising our
System-of-Systems, which may ultimately result in the removal of skilled people
from positions of control. Examples of these digitised System-of-Systems include driverless trains, planes/drones, submersibles and cars; however this
trend extends into all industry domains including the medical and defence are-as. The “rise of the machine” cannot be stopped and therefore results in the need for designers and safety engineers to think about: (1) significant System-of-Systems issues and epochs; and (2) how safety can be designed using a
common methodology or codes of practice. This paper draws on experience
from work undertaken in a number of domains including energy, rail, defence,
aerospace and information technology systems. This paper explores System-of-Systems problems including: epoch identification, risk ownership, disparate legislation and regulation, and why bottom-up summing of component safety arguments fails to address the problem. It proposes the need to imagine and develop safe systems of operation and test these. It considers how techniques
such as Soft Systems Methodology, Systems Engineering, Systems-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) and Hybrid Development Lifecycles
may aid System-of-Systems safety understanding and may help to expose potentially harmful emergent properties. Hide abstract
| Mike Brownsword, Andy German and Ian Mitchell
|
| Progress Towards the Assurance of Non - Traditional Software
7th Feb 2017
Traditional software development follows a hierarchical
process,
with system-level requirements
allocated to software
being progressively refined
through high-level requirements
into source code, coverage of which is a
key measure of test completeness. This approach establishes a direct link between
system-level requirements and the software implementation; it also assumes that
executable
behaviour is governed by the structure of the source
code. Although it is still widely applicable, there are cases where the suitability
of this traditional model is less apparent. Consider an algorithm implemented
via a neural network. In this case the structure of the source code has much less
effect on the software's behaviour than in the traditional case: the same
generic
neural network software could be trained to perform two very different functions. The link between
the implementation and the
high-level requirements is also harder to trace than in the traditional case. More generally, some of the
approaches used to assure software may not be appropriate for new types of
algorithm; nevertheless, such algorithms are becoming increasingly common.
In response, this paper
considers how
current methods, notably the 'four plus
one' software safety assurance principles, might be enhanced
to support the
assurance of non-traditional
software. Hide abstract
| Rob Ashmore, Elizabeth Lennon
|
| Functional Safety: Where have we come from? Where are we going?
7th Feb 2017
This
paper provides a personal perspective of the history and evolution of the discipline of Functional Safety. It starts with the concerns that provided the early drivers, the initiatives that moved the discipline from a diverse
and adhoc collection of different control
measures, to an internationally recognised, systematic framework with a broad spectrum of risk reduction principles,
to sector customised approaches for the consequences, risk reduction customs
and system behaviours found in different industry sectors. It also poses the
question of where future advancements will lie, in further refinement into sector
and industry specific practices or through development of a more comprehensive framework able to adapt to a wide variety of different threats in a uniform
manner. Hide abstract
| Audrey Canning
|
| Going ‘Back to the Future’: Developing safety - critical embedded systems using modern Time - Triggered software architectures
7th Feb 2017
This paper is concerned with the development of software for real-time, safety-related embedded systems. The particular focus of the paper is on
‘Time-Triggered’ (TT) systems. TT design can be viewed as a subset of more
generic ‘Event Triggered’ (ET) designs. When compared with ET alternatives,
TT designs have a simple software architecture and – once constructed – are
generally accepted as being easier to test. As a consequence, forms of TT design have been used for many years in industries such as aerospace, because
they have been found to provide the basis for safe and reliable systems. Despite
the growing demand for safety-related embedded systems in sectors such as
industrial control, automotive and household goods, use of TT architectures is
less common than ET architectures in these areas. This paper explores some of
the benefits of modern TT designs, and considers some of the reasons why this
approach is less commonly used than ET architectures in current safety-related
designs. Hide abstract
| Michael J. Pont
|
| Product Integrity Assurance Argument Framework for Vehicle Autonomy
7th Feb 2017
Increasing autonomy of vehicle control features requires product
integrity considerations that push the boundaries, and
lie beyond the scope, of
the present edition of the automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262.
They include reliability, availability and cyber security as well as the safety-related aspects of Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF), fail-operational
functionality and the human-machine interaction. The purpose of this paper is
to
suggest a
framework for the construction of an explicit
product integrity
assurance argument that caters for such considerations. The proposed framework
builds on work
previously developed by MISRA for arguing the achievement of
functional safety within the scope of ISO 26262. The paper asserts that there is
particular value in the creation of an explicit, holistic, product assurance ar-
gument for vehicles that feature
autonomy as the considerations are inherently
interrelated and extend beyond the scope of any one particular industry standard. Hide abstract
| John Birch, Mark Cousen, David Ward
|
| Experiences of avionics safety certification of an ARINC 653 RTOS on multi-core processor architecture
7th Feb 2017
The avionics industry is currently undergoing a transition to multi-core processor architectures. This transition provides the potential for increased functionality on a common computing platform, while reducing size,
weight and power (SWaP). The advent of multi-core processor architectures
also presents new challenges in the design, implementation and
safety-certification of real-time operating systems (RTOS). In this paper, the impact of
multi-core architecture on RTOS design, the ARINC 653 software standard,
and safety-certification under RTCA DO-178C and EUROCAE ED-12C will be
considered. Additionally Wind River’s experiences of the DO-178C DAL A
safety
certification of VxWorks 653 Multi-core Edition on the NXP QorIQ
T2080 multi-core processor will be presented. Hide abstract
| Paul J. Parkinson
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| Confidence in a connected world: safe, secure, resilient and autonomous
8th Feb 2017
Since
establishment of the SCSC in 1992 the world of safety-related
computing and assurance
has changed
enormously, but the fundamental principles of the approaches articulated in the first decade of the club remain valid.
However,
since 2000 the dramatic growth in the
Internet
and the changes to
security threats exemplified by the attacks of 9/11 have changed the safety engineering world. The need for change is further illustrated by the impact of climate change, the growing importance of interdependencies and lessons from
Fukushima accident
emphasising
the need for resilience.
Innovation
in technology, in particular the increasing autonomy of systems,
also provides
another
driver for change. The paper therefore discusses these three challenges: security-informed safety, resilience and autonomy. But in addition there is a significant challenge
in that
we must not forget “normal business”: the challenge of
continuing to
apply
what
we know in a rigorous
and competent manner in the
light of organisational change, project pressures and resource limitations. Hide abstract
| Robin E Bloomfield, Kate Netkachova, Peter Bishop
|
| Software Handling of Hardware Errors
8th Feb 2017
Developing embedded systems for safety-critical markets is not easy.
Over the past decade, detecting and handling the errors arising from increasingly unreliable hardware and increasingly complex, multi-threaded software
has made this even more difficult. This paper describes a software architecture
that separates various aspects of the system design,
providing increased and
tuneable immunity to random software and hardware errors. Hide abstract
| Chris Hobbs
|
| Closing the Gap – The Formally Verified Optimizing Compiler CompCert
8th Feb 2017
CompCert is the first commercially available optimizing compiler
that is formally verified, using machine-assisted mathematical proofs, to be free
from miscompilation. The executable
code it produces is proved to behave exactly as specified by the semantics of the source C program. CompCert's intended use is the compilation of safety-critical and mission-critical software
meeting high levels of assurance. This article gives an overview
of the design of
CompCert and its proof concept, summarizes the resulting confidence argument, and gives an overview of relevant tool qualification strategies. We briefly
summarize practical experience and give an overview of recent CompCert developments. Hide abstract
| Daniel Kästner, Xavier Leroy, Sandrine Blazy, Bernhard Schommer, Michael Schmidt, Christian Ferdinand
|
| Using Formal Proof to meet Executable Object Code and Coverage Objectives in DO-333
8th Feb 2017
This paper describes a technology proof of concept for the automated
verification of Executable Object Code (EOC) using Formal Methods. The
project called FEVER was carried out by D-RisQ Ltd in conjunction with Lemma1,
both small companies with expertise on various facets of formal verification.
The target use of FEVER is within embedded systems that will be require
safety certification, specifically targeting unmanned systems. The rationale
being that if a route to certification using formal development from requirements
to EOC could be shown, then the perceived untenable amount of testing
for such systems could be drastically reduced. We chose to use the aerospace
software guidance DO-178C, the Formal Methods Supplement DO-333 and
Tool Qualification DO-330 as these set out the relevant Objectives for a formal
development. The work required the use of a formalised version of the ARM 7
Instruction Set Architecture. This was captured in a language called HOL and
was based upon work carried out by Cambridge University. The project used
source code for a simple decision making system written in C in order to develop
the technology. Hide abstract
| N J Tudor, C M O’Halloran
|
| My 36 Years in System Safety Engineering: Looking Backward, Looking Forward
8th Feb 2017
A personal view of where we have come from in system safety, where
we are now, and what is needed going forward. Hide abstract
| Nancy G. Leveson
|
| From Safety Cases to Security Cases
8th Feb 2017
Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they
provide a way to justify the safety of a system and render that justification open
to review. Assurance cases have not been widely used in security, but there is
guidance available and there have been some promising experiments. There are
a number of differences between safety and security which have implications for
how we create security cases, but they do not appear to be insurmountable. It
appears that the process of creating a security case is compatible with typical
evaluation processes, and will have additional benefits in terms of training and
corporate memory. In this paper we discuss some of the implications and challenges
of applying the practice of assurance case construction from the safety
domain to the security domain. Hide abstract
| R D Alexander, R D Hawkins, T P Kelly
|
| Cyber Safety and Security for Reduced Crew Operations (RCO)
8th Feb 2017
The civil aviation industry is looking into reduced crew operations
(RCO) that would cut today's two-person flight crews down to single-person
crews with support from ground-based crews. Shared responsibility across air
and ground personnel will require highly reliable and secure data communication
with supporting automation, which will be safety-critical for passenger and
cargo aircraft. This paper looks at the different types and degrees of authority
delegation given from the air to the ground and the ramifications of each, including
the safety and security hazards introduced, the mitigation mechanisms
for these hazards, and other demands on an RCO system architecture, which
would be highly invasive into (almost) all safety-critical avionics. The related
areas of unmanned aerial systems and autonomous ground vehicles are reviewed
to find problems that RCO may face, and related aviation accident scenarios
are described. Potential problems with RCO data communication encryption
are identified. This paper concludes with questioning the economic
viability of RCO in the light of the expense of overcoming the safety and security
hazards it would introduce. Hide abstract
| Kevin R. Driscoll
|
| Waking up to The Insider as a Safety-Critical Threat
8th Feb 2017
The Insider threat is rarely considered as part of functional safety to
inform design, process and procedure. Worryingly, it is often neglected as part
of safety and risk management practices entirely. This must change in light of
high profile cases in recent years where Insiders have been seen to pose a severe
threat. Industry must attempt to analyse and understand Insider threat risk
and build this into integral processes, which will require close collaboration
across diverse technical areas and specialisms. Government policy may even be
developed in the coming years, similar to that of US Executive Order 13587,
which necessitates a more comprehensive consideration of these risks. Now is
the time for safety-critical industries to wake up to the Insider threat as one of
the most real and present dangers to organisations in the modern age.
This paper is a thought-piece about how Insider threat could be dealt with as
part of normal engineering practice, and proposes a concept methodology for
the formal assessment of Insider threat risk to systems and organisations. The
paper deals only with deliberate and malicious acts (intended to do harm in
some way), rather than the unintentional insider threat.
| Ryan Meeks and Robert Dickie
|
| From the IBM 29 Card Punch to the Boeing 787 Dreamliner (and Beyond)
9th Feb 2017
This paper is a reflection on the author’s career in software engineering
over the last 35 years, with an emphasis on what he has learned along
the way and its relevance to safety-critical avionic software development. Hide abstract
| Dewi Daniels
|
| Analysis of Effects induced by EM disturbances on COTS Devices, from an EM Security and Functional Safety perspective
9th Feb 2017
Electromagnetic Security refers to the compliance of electronic devices
with Information Security requirements with regards to electromagnetic
disturbances, and has important implications where there are Functional Safety
or other risks to be managed. In this study, the resilience and the integrity of
electronic devices are the topics of interest. Many studies have been devoted to
the detection, the analysis and the classification of failures and damage by electromagnetic
interference induced on commercial off-the-shelf devices, which
mostly require external monitoring and measurement equipment. More recently,
an approach based on the exploitation of existing internal resources of the
tested devices has been proposed. Monitoring of effects due to exposure to EM
fields is important for both EM Security and Functional Safety. This paper
shows how this can be done by measuring the existing internal parameters of
computers and smartphones during exposure to unintentional or intentional
electromagnetic fields. Hide abstract
| José Lopes Esteves, Chaouki Kasmi, Andy Degraeve, Davy Pissoort, Keith Armstrong
|
| Sneak Path Analysis: Realising the Potential
9th Feb 2017
Sneak Analysis (SA) is a technique originating from work carried
out by Boeing in the 1960s. Sneak Path Analysis (SPA) is a derivative of SA that
focuses on the identification of latent, unintended paths that, under specific
circumstances, can cause otherwise functional systems to exhibit undesired
behaviours. SPA has not, however, been globally embraced by the safety engineering
community. This is unfortunate, as there are some unique concepts and
features of SPA (such as the explicit identification of systematic design flaws)
that cannot be substituted by any other safety analysis techniques. This paper
summarises a project that resulted in the development of a revised SPA procedure
that can be implemented as an extension of the widely utilised Hazard and
Operability (HAZOP) study. The procedure was applied to practical examples
and was shown to be repeatable, efficient and applicable to a range of technologies. Hide abstract
| Steve Gregory
|
| HFACS: Helicopter Operations’ Safety
9th Feb 2017
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is an
accident investigation methodology. It is based on Reason model, the causality
perspective commonly known as “Swiss Cheese” model. HFACS methodology
became necessary because the Reason model is primarily descriptive, not analytical.
It was designed to facilitate the application of this model to accident
investigation and analysis. It was, specifically, developed to define the latent
and active failures implicated in Reason model; and, refined through the analysis
of hundreds of Aviation accident reports, containing thousands of human
causal factors. The present work aims to evaluate the use of HFACS for the
improvement of the Brazilian helicopter offshore transport industry safety performance.
To do so, the present paper presents the Reason model, the HFACS
and the HFACS-HE frameworks, considering evolution, limits, critical reviews,
and applications (particularly, in Aviation). A documentary analysis of selected
helicopter offshore transport industry accident reports from Brazil was carried
out using HFACS-HE. Then, the study was compared with other studies already
carried out for similar operations. It concludes that the causality model and
culture frameworks have an impact on the application of HFACS, and on the
safety performance. Hide abstract
| José Corrêa de Sá
|
| Integrating Data into the Safety Assessment Methodology for Defence
9th Feb 2017
The work of the Data Safety Initiative Working Group (DSIWG) has
been progressing since January 2013 with the aim of integrating the assessment
of data safety into the system engineering development process, which incorporates
system safety assessment. While the Data Safety Guidance is being continually
improved and public emphasis on data in our lives is growing, Raytheon
UK is integrating the data safety assessment into the system safety assessment
process. Raytheon UK’s previous case study focussed on Air Traffic Management
Systems (ATMS) but, since there are a multitude of safety assessment
requirements which are customer-dependent within ATMS, this methodology
paper focusses on defence and aims to develop sector-specific data safety guidance
for defence engineering programmes in the UK. Hide abstract
| Louise Harney
|
| Cybersecurity problems in a typical hospital (and probably in all of them)
9th Feb 2017
A criminal case balancing on the corruption of patient data in a UK
hospital resulted in some nurses being acquitted and some given community
service and custodial sentences. This paper explains the background, demonstrates
the inability of hospital IT systems to provide reliable evidence, and
highlights broader problems with IT culture affecting manufacturers, hospitals,
police, legal advisors — and ultimately misleading clinicians and compromising
delivery of care.
The NHS (and healthcare more generally) urgently needs to improve
its IT awareness, management and policies. The police and the legal system
need a more mature approach to IT. Manufacturers need to provide dependable
systems that are fit for purpose for complex hospital environments. Regulators
should ensure that systems meet better standards of quality and dependability.
This paper includes recommendations; the most fundamental being
that hospitals acknowledge that IT is unreliable and they should procure and
manage equipment with this in mind. In particular, mature and effective data
protection and cybersecurity policies must be in place and used proactively.
When problems occur, evidence derived from IT (whether systems or devices)
must not be used in legal or disciplinary investigations without extreme care
and independent proof of provenance.
| Harold Thimbleby
|
| Data: Your Life in its Hands
9th Feb 2017
This work is an examination of how safety-related data is currently
being managed across the healthcare domain in the UK. Some areas where
safety data can cause specific problems are highlighted and extant mitigations
noted. Some case studies where data has been a contributory factor in the occurrence
of harm are discussed. The work concludes with new proposed guidance
material to supplement the existing safety guidance on Health IT Systems. Hide abstract
| Tom Adams, Paul Hampton, Mike Parsons
|
| Safety critical systems - A brief history of the development of guidelines and standards
9th Feb 2017
This paper provides an overview of the development of standards
and guidelines for safety critical systems over the past 35 years. In the context
of this paper “safety critical systems” refers to those systems that are intended
to achieve, together with the other risk reduction measures, the necessary risk
reduction to meet the required tolerable risk. The period covered by the paper
is from the time that concerns were raised about the adoption of programmable
electronic systems for implementing safety functions to today. It is essentially a
personal account based on experience and reflections of the developments have
taken place with to respect of guidelines and standards and is not intended in
any way to be an authoritative account covering all industrial sectors. Hide abstract
| Ron Bell
|
| Balancing safety with rampant software feature-itis
9th Feb 2017
In the 30 years or so that we have been developing a safety methodology
to accompany the growing presence of software in safety-related systems,
understanding of the software development process itself hardly seems to have
advanced. We still use in most part the same languages we did then but duly
bloated to match the uncontrollable growth of software itself. We still teach
entire paradigms without any basis in the scientific method whatsoever whilst
the amount of software continues to grow alarmingly, particularly in the automotive
industry. The result is an absence of any real forensic basis for understanding
failure and subsequently avoiding it. This short essay looks at some of
the reasons why, and demonstrates from recent results in information theory,
that this stems from the fact that we are probably barking up the wrong tree. Hide abstract
| Les Hatton
|
|
| Jan 2017
|
| [SCSC-127B] Data Safety Guidance (Version 2.0)
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
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| May 2016
|
| [SCSC-144] Safety Systems vol.25-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 3
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| Feb 2016
|
| [SCSC-131] Developing Safe Systems
Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK.
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| Jan 2016
|
| [SCSC-127A] Data Safety Guidance (Version 1.3)
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
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| Jan 2016
|
| [SCSC-148] Safety Systems vol.25-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 2
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| Sep 2015
|
| [SCSC-145] Safety Systems vol.25-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 25, Number 1
|
| May 2015
|
| [SCSC-147] Safety Systems vol.24-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 3
|
| Feb 2015
|
| [SCSC-129] Engineering Systems for Safety
Proceedings of the Twenty-third Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
|
| Jan 2015
|
| [SCSC-128] Data Safety (Version 1.2)
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
|
| Jan 2015
|
| [SCSC-146] Safety Systems vol.24-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 2
|
| Sep 2014
|
| [SCSC-139] Safety Systems vol.24-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 24, Number 1
|
| May 2014
|
| [SCSC-134] Safety Systems vol.23-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 23, Number 2
|
| Feb 2014
|
| [SCSC-127] Data Safety Guidance (Version 1.0)
by the SCSC Data Safety Initiative Working Group [DSIWG]
|
| Feb 2014
|
| [SCSC-126] Addressing Systems Safety Challenges
Proceedings of the Twenty-second Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK.
|
| Jan 2014
|
| [SCSC-132] Safety Systems vol.23-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 23, Number 2
|
| Sep 2013
|
| [SCSC-125] Safety Systems vol.23-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 23, Number 1
|
| May 2013
|
| [SCSC-124] Safety Systems vol.22-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 22, Number 3
|
| Feb 2013
|
| [SCSC-119] Assuring the Safety of Systems
Proceedings of the Twenty-first Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
|
| Jan 2013
|
| [SCSC-123] Safety Systems vol.22-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 22, Number 2
|
| Sep 2012
|
| [SCSC-122] Safety Systems vol.22-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 22, Number 1
|
| May 2012
|
| [SCSC-121] Safety Systems vol.21-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 21, Number 3
|
| Feb 2012
|
| [SCSC-116] Achieving Systems Safety
Proceedings of the Twentieth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
|
| Jan 2012
|
| [SCSC-120] Safety Systems vol.21-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 21, Number 2
|
| Nov 2011
|
| [SCSC-141] GSN Standard (Version 1)
Version 1 of the Goal Structuring Notation Community standard
|
| Sep 2011
|
| [SCSC-118] Safety Systems vol.21-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 21, Number 1
|
| May 2011
|
| [SCSC-117] Safety Systems vol.20-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 20, Number 3
|
| Feb 2011
|
| [SCSC-109] Advances in Systems Safety
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK.
|
| Jan 2011
|
| [SCSC-115] Safety Systems vol.20-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 20, Number 2
|
| Sep 2010
|
| [SCSC-114] Safety Systems vol.20-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 20, Number 1
|
| May 2010
|
| [SCSC-112] Safety Systems vol.19-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 19, Number 3
|
| Mar 2010
|
| [SCSC-113] Alarp explored
|
| Feb 2010
|
| [SCSC-107] Making Systems Safer
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
|
| Jan 2010
|
| [SCSC-111] Safety Systems vol.19-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 19, Number 2
|
| Sep 2009
|
| [SCSC-110] Safety Systems vol.19-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 19, Number 1
|
| May 2009
|
| [SCSC-108] Safety Systems vol.18-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 18, Number 3
|
| Feb 2009
|
| [SCSC-102] Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Processes and Practices
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK.
|
| Jan 2009
|
| [SCSC-106] Safety Systems vol.18-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 18, Number 2
|
| Sep 2008
|
| [SCSC-105] Safety Systems vol.18-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 18, Number 1
|
| May 2008
|
| [SCSC-104] Safety Systems vol.17-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 17, Number 3
|
| Feb 2008
|
| [SCSC-1] Improvements in System Safety
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK.
|
| Jan 2008
|
| [SCSC-103] Safety Systems vol.17-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 17, Number 2
|
| Sep 2007
|
| [SCSC-69] Safety Systems vol.17-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 17, Number 1
|
| May 2007
|
| [SCSC-70] Safety Systems vol.16-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 16, Number 3
|
| Feb 2007
|
| [SCSC-5] The Safety of Systems
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK
|
| Jan 2007
|
| [SCSC-71] Safety Systems vol.16-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 16, Number 2
|
| Sep 2006
|
| [SCSC-72] Safety Systems vol.16-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 16, Number 1
|
| May 2006
|
| [SCSC-73] Safety Systems vol.15-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 15, Number 3
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| Feb 2006
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| [SCSC-6] Developments in Risk-based Approaches to Safety
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Safety-citical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK
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| Jan 2006
|
| [SCSC-74] Safety Systems vol.15-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 15, Number 2
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| Sep 2005
|
| [SCSC-75] Safety Systems vol.15-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 15, Number 1
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| May 2005
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| [SCSC-76] Safety Systems vol.14-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 14, Number 3
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| Feb 2005
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| [SCSC-7] Constituents of Modern System-safety Thinking
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK
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| Jan 2005
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| [SCSC-77] Safety Systems vol.14-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 14, Number 2
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| Sep 2004
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| [SCSC-78] Safety Systems vol.14-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 14, Number 1
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| May 2004
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| [SCSC-79] Safety Systems vol.13-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 13, Number 3
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| Feb 2004
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| [SCSC-8] Practical Elements of Safety
Proceedings of the Twelfth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Birmingham, UK
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| Jan 2004
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| [SCSC-80] Safety Systems vol.13-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 13, Number 2
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| Sep 2003
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| [SCSC-81] Safety Systems vol.13-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 13, Number 1
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| May 2003
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| [SCSC-82] Safety Systems vol.12-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 12, Number 3
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| Feb 2003
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| [SCSC-9] Current Issues in Safety-Critical Systems
Proceedings of the Eleventh Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK
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| Jan 2003
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| [SCSC-83] Safety Systems vol.12-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 12, Number 2
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| Sep 2002
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| [SCSC-84] Safety Systems vol.12-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 12, Number 1
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| May 2002
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| [SCSC-85] Safety Systems vol.11-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 11, Number 3
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| Feb 2002
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| [SCSC-10] Components of System Safety
Proceedings of the Tenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK
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| Jan 2002
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| [SCSC-86] Safety Systems vol.11-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 11, Number 2
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| Sep 2001
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| [SCSC-87] Safety Systems vol.11-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 11, Number 1
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| May 2001
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| [SCSC-88] Safety Systems vol.10-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 10, Number 3
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| Feb 2001
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| [SCSC-11] Aspects of Safety Management
Proceedings of the Ninth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK
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| Jan 2001
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| [SCSC-89] Safety Systems vol.10-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 10, Number 2
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| Sep 2000
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| [SCSC-90] Safety Systems vol.10-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 10, Number 1
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| May 2000
|
| [SCSC-91] Safety Systems vol.9-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 9, Number 3
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| Feb 2000
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| [SCSC-12] Lessons in System Safety
Proceedings of the Eighth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK
|
| Jan 2000
|
| [SCSC-92] Safety Systems vol.9-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 9, Number 2
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| Dec 1999
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| [SCSC-101] Software Safety - An Insider's View of the Safety-Critical Systems Club
|
| Sep 1999
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| [SCSC-93] Safety Systems vol.9-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 9, Number 1
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| May 1999
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| [SCSC-94] Safety Systems vol.8-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 8, Number 3
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| Feb 1999
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| [SCSC-13] Towards System Safety
Proceedings of the Seventh Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Huntingdon, UK
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| Jan 1999
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| [SCSC-95] Safety Systems vol.8-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 8, Number 2
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| Sep 1998
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| [SCSC-96] Safety Systems vol.8-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 8, Number 1
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| May 1998
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| [SCSC-97] Safety Systems vol.7-3
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 7, Number 3
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| Feb 1998
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| [SCSC-14] Industrial Perspectives of Safety-Critical Systems
Proceedings of the Sixth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Birmingham, UK
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| Jan 1998
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| [SCSC-98] Safety Systems vol.7-2
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 7, Number 2
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| Jun 1997
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| [SCSC-100] Life Cycle Management for Dependability
|
| Feb 1997
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| [SCSC-15] Safer Systems
Proceedings of the Fifth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK
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| Feb 1996
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| [SCSC-16] Safety-Critical Systems: The Convergence of High Tech and Human Factors
Proceedings of the Fourth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Leeds, UK
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| Feb 1995
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| [SCSC-17] Achievement and Assurance of Safety
Proceedings of the Third Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Brighton, UK
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| Feb 1994
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| [SCSC-18] Technology and Assessment of Safety-Critical Systems
Proceedings of the Second Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Birmingham, UK
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| Feb 1993
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| [SCSC-19] Directions in Safety-critical Systems
Proceedings of the Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK
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| Jan 1993
|
| [SCSC-20] Safety-Critical Systems
Current issues, techniques and standards
|
| Sep 1991
|
| [SCSC-99] Safety Systems vol.1-1
The Safety-Critical Systems Club Newsletter, Volume 1, Number 1
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